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hat is mathematics actually about? To the non-
philosopher, this question can seem somewhat
absurd. Mathematics is about things like numbers,
sets, and functions. But what, exactly, are these entities? Do
they exist in space–time like protons and electrons? Are they
manmade creations? How do we come to know anything
about them? When pressed further, two more sophisticated
positions tend to emerge. Platonism is the view that mathe-
matical entities exist in a non–spatio-temporal realm
sometimes referred to as ‘‘Plato’s heaven.’’ Things such as
numbers and sets are abstract, mind-independent, and have
no causal powers. The biggest problem facing the Platonist is
their inability to clearly explicate what Plato’s heaven actually
is, and how we could come to know anything about the
abstract entities that exist there without any causal interaction.
The second position is mathematical nominalism.
Nominalists deny that mathematical entities are real or that
they exist in any deep sense beyond the way in which we
utilize them, such as ink-strokes on a page or verbal
utterances. There are many different gradations of nomi-
nalism, but all agree that mathematics does not have a
subject matter that is abstract or mind-independent. The
biggest challenges for nominalists are that their positions
seem to conflict with the beliefs of most practicing math-
ematicians, and nominalism does not seem able to explain
why applied mathematics is so successful.
In his book An Aristotelian Realist Philosophy of
Mathematics, James Franklin argues that Platonism and
nominalism represent a false dichotomy in the philosophy
of mathematics. There is (at least) one more potential
answer to fundamental questions about mathematics that
can evade the drawbacks of the two leading views.
Franklin’s position draws from a classical Aristotelian phi-
losophy of mathematics. Unlike Platonism and nominalism,
classical Aristotelianism says that mathematics is not about
particular entities such as the number 2 or the set of natural
numbers, but instead is about universals that are instanti-
ated in the actual physical world. Science is fundamentally
about universals. Although scientists study particular
objects, what they are actually investigating are universal
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properties and relations. Physics is interested in universals
such as charge or colour, whereas psychology investigates
mental universals like mental states. So what is mathematics
actually about? Aristotelians believe that mathematics is just
another science. Mathematics investigates the real world to
learn about mathematical universals such as symmetry or
ratio. These universals are mathematical properties and
relations that are as real and physical as any other scientific
universal.
Platonism and nominalism can also accommodate the
view that the subject matter of mathematics is about uni-
versals and not particulars, but each position has a different
take on what these universals actually are. For the Platonist,
mathematical universals are real and they exist, but they are
purely abstract and noncausal, and do not exist in the
physical world. For the nominalist, universals are not real at
all and have no actual properties. The classical Aristotelian
position claims that mathematical universals are real, have
causal powers, and exist in the physical world. Their exis-
tence is due to their instantiation in the physical world and
not in some abstract Platonic realm. In this way, the Aris-
totelian is able to maintain a realist interpretation of
mathematics but avoid any sort of commitment to an abstract,
highly metaphysical realm that we have no causal access to.
Classical Aristotelianism has faced two famous and crip-
pling challenges. If mathematics is about real physical things,
then what about mathematical universals that are uninstan-
tiated in the physical world? Consider extremely large finite
numbers, certain complex or real numbers, or the empty set.
It is possible that none of these are instantiated in the world.
The second challenge is similar but appeals to infinity.
Higher-level mathematics makes use of infinite sets of sizes
far larger than the set of natural numbers. Even ifwe allow for
an infinite physical universe, or perhaps an infinitely divisi-
ble and continuous space–time, the infinite sets with larger
cardinality used in mathematics do not seem to be instanti-
ated (or instantiatable) in the physical world. Classical
Aristotelianism says that mathematics is about instantiated
universals. If this is so, then all of these uninstantiated
mathematical universals do not exist. This clearly does not
mesh well with mathematical practice, and has thus led to the
abandonment of the classical Aristotelian view.
Franklin’s book is divided into two parts. Part I is a
demonstration that Aristotelianism can make sense of all
mathematical objects. In Chapters 1 and 2, Franklin intro-
duces his own brand of Aristotelianism (Franklin introduces
his position as ‘‘semi-Platonism’’ and ‘‘modal-Aristotelian-
ism’’ but eventually abandons these terms in favour of just
‘‘Aristotelianism’’) that draws from both Platonist and clas-
sical Aristotelian philosophies in order to tackle the problem
of the uninstantiated. Franklin claims that mathematics is not
just about instantiated universals, but also about universals
that are uninstantiated as well. For the most part, the uni-
versals that are actually instantiated in the world are a
contingent matter. With two notable exceptions, there is
nothing about an uninstantiated universal that necessarily
rules it out from being instantiated. Franklin argues that we
can still know about these uninstantiated universals and
study their necessary interrelations. Whereas classical Aris-
totelianism says that universals are exactly those that are
instantiated in the physical world, Franklin’s Aristotelianism
says that universals are those that could be instantiated in the
physical world. Franklin’s slogan for Aristotelianism makes
this clear: ‘‘Instantiation is possible, but not necessary’’.
The central aim of the remainder of Part I is to
demonstrate that almost all of mathematics can be under-
stood as universals that could be instantiated in the physical
world. Franklin goes through entities such as quantity,
ratio, finite sets, geometry, and more to justify his position.
The bulk of this presentation does not depart from a tra-
ditional classical Aristotelian take. The interesting and
novel sections are where Franklin tackles uninstantiated
universals that have posed difficulty for classical Aris-
totelianism, such as highly abstract mathematical objects
(Chapter 4), and objects so large that they cannot be real-
ized in anything physical (Chapter 8).
In Part II, Franklin argues that Aristotelianism can
account for mathematical practice. Franklin goes through
many classic and contemporary issues of mathematical
practice such as proof, structure, explanation, visualization,
and idealization, and claims that all these mathematical
techniques can explain how we come to know about
mathematical universals that either are or could be instan-
tiated in the physical world. Franklin draws from a wealth
of modern philosophy and science including theories of
scientific explanation, artificial intelligence, infant learning,
and imagination. Part II is far more speculative compared
to Part I, which is grounded on concrete examples from
both abstract and applied mathematics.
In what follows I will present three specific examples
from An Aristotelian Realist Philosophy of Mathematics that
are important cases for the Aristotelian. First are highly
abstract objects that are not instantiated in the physical
world. Second are objects of extremely large size, such as
infinite sets. Third are zero and the empty set—two familiar
objects that pose a unique challenge and solution. Frank-
lin’s treatment of these three issues provides a clear
illustration of how his Aristotelianism is different from
classical Aristotelianism, Platonism, and nominalism.
Franklin uses groups as an exemplar for an Aristotelian
handling of highly abstract objects. Consider the cyclic
group of order 2. This group has many abstract instantia-
tions, but it also has physical instantiations such as a Caps
Lock button, or any other simple toggle. The group SO(3) is
a bit more complicated, but it too can be realized in a
system of all physical rotations in three-dimensional space.
But what about the infinite system of all possible rotations?
For this to be physical, then all of SO(3) would need to be
realized at once. But this is impossible because of the
(supposed) finite nature of the universe. Franklin notes that
the universe’s finite size is a contingent fact that could have
been otherwise. There is nothing about the system of all
possible rotations itself that necessitates it being uninstan-
tiated physically. If the world had been different, then this
system could have a real and physical instantiation. Aris-
totelianism ‘‘emphasizes the realizability, rather than actual
realization, of universals’’. Given this, we can still study and
learn about uninstantiated universals by analyzing things
such as their structure and relations despite not having a
particular physical instantiation to study.
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Franklin’s treatment of infinity is a bit less clear. It is
certainly possible that there are physical instantiations of
some sizes of infinity such as infinitely many points in
space, but Franklin does not believe that higher-order
infinite sets can be instantiated in our finite universe. As
mentioned earlier, the finiteness of the universe is a con-
tingent fact, and thus higher-order infinite sets could be
instantiated so these sets are real mathematical objects.
Quizzically, Franklin seems to be somewhat standoffish in
his commitment to infinite sets. He argues at length that the
bulk of mathematics can be done without any infinite
concepts. The infinite is a ‘‘luxury’’ that makes our calcu-
lations easier and smoother, but can be done without.
Another assertion Franklin makes is that it is fine for one to
be a realist regarding infinities of countable size, but to
reject higher-order infinities. A different argument for the
reality of larger infinite sets is needed, at which Franklin
only gestures. So, although it seems that the Aristotelian
should count infinite sets as real mathematical objects,
Franklin has laid the groundwork for the Aristotelian to
survive if we choose to reject infinite sets as well.
Unlike the highly abstract or extremely large objects
considered earlier that could be instantiated, zero and the
empty set are different in that, according to Franklin, they
are both necessarily uninstantiatable. Aristotelianism thus
dictates that zero and the empty set are not real mathe-
matical objects, but this seems counterintuitive as both
objects are ubiquitous in mathematical practice. Franklin
knows that although it is certainly convenient to use zero
and the empty set, and they may even be indispensable to
our understanding of mathematics, this does not mean that
they are real. Franklin bites the bullet and adopts a nomi-
nalist interpretation toward zero and the empty set. No one
doubts their utility, but ‘‘[n]o amount of mathematical
convenience… can alter metaphysical reality’’. It is possible
and actual instantiation in the physical world that dictates
mathematical reality, and zero and the empty set do not
meet this requirement. Franklin goes to great lengths to
demonstrate that all the standard objects of mathematics
such as the natural numbers, abstract groups, and more are
all real according to Aristotelianism, but despite this his
realism does not extend over zero and the empty set.
Franklin does a nice job of developing the Aristotelian
position. He blends a rich philosophical history of Aris-
totelianism with modern case studies in both applied and
pure mathematics to illustrate how we can conceive of
mathematical objects as physically possibly instantiated
universals. Although he easily could have stopped there,
Franklin recognizes that an important issue for contempo-
rary philosophy of mathematics is to give an account of
how philosophy fits with actual mathematical practice. The
attention paid to the many techniques of mathematicians in
Part II provides a nice rounding out of Aristotelianism and
is certainly a strength of the book. It is one thing to carve
out a unique and consistent philosophical position, but it is
an entirely other matter to show it to be both tenable and
attractive in practice. Franklin has succeeded in making
significant inroads toward both of these goals.
Ultimately I find myself somewhat unconvinced. The
most important idea behind Aristotelianism is that of the
potentially instantiable universal. If a mathematical uni-
versal is instantiated, then we know that it is real and exists
in virtue of this instantiation. We also are able to investigate
the universal just as a scientist would investigate universals
like charge or spin. As stated in the opening line of the
book, ‘‘mathematics is a science of the real world’’ (1).
Mathematical objects are ‘‘mind-independent objects which
are spatio-temporal and causal, namely relations such as
ratios’’. But how does this fit with Franklin’s assertion that
uninstantiated universals are real? They are clearly not in
the ‘‘real world,’’ nor are they spatio-temporal and causal,
so what is the nature of their existence? Franklin gets
around this by claiming that these questions are not
meaningful. Uninstantiated universals are not granted any
sort of ‘‘existence.’’ But why are questions of existence
meaningful for instantiated universals, yet at the same time
meaningless for the uninstantiated? This is certainly a
convenient move in order to avoid the existence of some
sort of nonphysical Platonic realm, but I find it suspiciously
ad hoc and unsatisfying. There is a clear conflict here
between the physical properties of instantiated universals
and those of the uninstantiated. To make this clear, what
can it possibly mean for uninstantiated mathematical
objects to have causal powers? If mathematics contains
both instantiated and uninstantiated objects, then we can-
not say that mathematics is a science of the real world at all.
Franklin has created a two-class system of mathematical
objects based around instantiation. The dividing line
between the two tiers is contingent, as which universals are
instantiated and which are not is entirely contingent
according to Aristotelianism. For those that fall on the
instantiated side of the line we adopt a physical realist
interpretation, whereas for those that are uninstantiated we
seem to adopt a quasirealist interpretation. Even if this is
somehow consistent, I have concerns that this quasirealist
understanding of uninstantiated universals is simply nom-
inalism in disguise. Franklin insists that Aristotelians are still
realist regarding uninstantiated universals, but I struggle to
see how his realism works in these cases beyond mere lip-
service.
Franklin attempts to evade these problems by claiming
that what really matters is that we ‘‘insist on the reality of
relations between universals, instantiated or not’’ (29).
Unfortunately, avoiding existence questions of mathemati-
cal universals by invoking the reality of relations simply
shifts the problem back one level. Suppose I grant that
relations of instantiated universals are real, such as the ratio
of my height to that of my mother. What exactly does it
mean for the relations of uninstantiated universals to be
real? What does it mean for these relations to exist in
something other than the physical world? Do these unin-
stantiated relations have causal powers? Instead of having a
two-class system of mathematical universals, we now have
a two-class system of mathematical relations where the
exact same problems emerge.
Despite my skepticism, An Aristotelian Realist Philoso-
phy of Mathematics is an interesting and challenging book.
Franklin is certainly correct in stating that Platonism and
nominalism unfairly dominate the landscape in the phi-
losophy of mathematics, and developing a rival position is
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no small achievement. Franklin goes through a wealth of
material in philosophy, mathematics, and science to moti-
vate and justify his position. Although this is certainly a
strength of the book in that it leaves no stone unturned, it is
also a weakness as a vast amount of prior knowledge is
required to understand all of Franklin’s arguments.
Whereas An Aristotelian Realist Philosophy of Mathematics
may not be entirely accessible to the novice philosopher of
mathematics, there will still be something for all readers to
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